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I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court decisions that construed the zon-
ing provisions of the neighboring Cleveland, Ohio, suburbs of Euclid'
and Eastlake 2 are significant landmarks in American zoning law. In the
fifty years separating the decisions the focus has shifted from the validity
of municipality-wide regulations to the application of zoning change to
meet a variety of needs. The Euclid case validated the use of municipali-
ty-wide restrictive zoning to promote public health, safety, and welfare
and defined the legislative power to pass a comprehensive zoning ordi-
* J.D. 1966, University of Pittsburgh; Member of the Allegheny County and Penn-
sylvania Bar; Partner, Rosenzweig, Rosenzweig & Burton.
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
2. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668(1976), rev'd, 41 Ohio St.
2d 187, 70 Ohio Op. 2d 384, 324 N.E.2d 740 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eastlake].
nance.3 The Eastlake case addresses whether zoning change that affects
one property is a legislative or an adjudicatory process.4 The Court in
Eastlake held that when there is no unnecessary hardship zoning change
is a legislative rather than an adjudicatory process. 5 The Stevens dissent
in Eastlake views all zoning change as an adjudicatory process requiring
due process of law. 6 This article adopts the thesis that all zoning change
requests should be afforded due process of law in an adjudicatory manner
with judicial review.
II. The Eastlake Case
Eastlake, a Cleveland suburb with a population of 20,000 adopted a
charter provision that it contended was authorized by the Ohio constitu-
tion. The provision mandated a 55% voter approval of any zoning
ordinance amendment approved by the planning commission and council
before it became effective. Of the approximately forty suburban
municipalities surrounding Cleveland, twenty had adopted similar charter
provisions. The Ohio constitution provides that all political power is
inherent in the people7 and reserves initiative and referendum powers to
the people of each municipality on all questions that such municipalities
may be authorized to control by legislative action. 
8
The Eastlake council passed an amendment to the Eastlake com-
prehensive zoning ordinance rezoning an eight acre parcel of Forest City
Enterprises from industrial to multi-family high rise use. The rezoning
failed to obtain 55% voter approval. Forest City Enterprises filed a
declaratory judgment action, asserting that the Eastlake charter provision
was unconstitutional. It contended that voter approval, as a prerequisite to
any land use or zoning change, denied the landowner due process of law
and violated the referendum provisions of the Ohio constitution.
Whether the voter approval requirement for rezoning in the Eastlake
charter violates the referendum provisions of the Ohio constitution de-
3. In 1922, Euclid, Ohio adopted an ordinance establishing a comprehensive zoning
plan with six use districts, a class of prohibited uses, and height and area restrictions.
Ambler Realty Company challenged the Euclid ordinance as a deprivation of property
without due process and a violation of equal protection. The specific issue was whether the
ordinance violated the constitutional protection of property rights through attempted regula-
tions that were unreasonable and confiscatory. In finding the Euclid zoning ordinance a
proper exercise of police power, the Supreme Court articulated the required standards
against which all similar exercises of police power have since been measured: zoning
provisions are unconstitutional when they "are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having
no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 272 U.S. at
395.
4. 426 U.S. at 674-80 nn.8 & 13. For a review of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision
and the underlying facts, see the following casenotes: 9 AKRON L. REV. 175 (1975); 24 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 635 (1975); 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 859 (1975).
5. The majority limits zoning change requests that merit due process hearings and
court review to administrative relief granted by variances only in the case of unnecessary
hardship that renders the land valueless.
6. 426 U.S. at 680-86.
7. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 2.
8. OHio CONST. art. 11, § If.
pends on whether rezoning of one parcel is legislative. If legislative, it
falls within Article II, Section If of the Ohio constitution, which permits
initiative and referendum on all questions that municipalities may control
by legislative action. 9 The nature of zoning change for one parcel is the
key issue addressed by the United States Supreme Court. Owner depriva-
tion of desired uses without due process and the social desirability of
exclusionary zoning depend upon the Court's view of the zoning change
process.
A. Majority Opinion
The majority in Eastlake confined their decision to the narrow
question raised in the petition for certiorari-the validity of the due
process holding of the Ohio Supreme Court.10 Speaking through Chief
Justice Burger, the Court found no violation of due process and reversed
the Ohio Supreme Court. At the outset, Justice Burger noted the Ohio
Supreme Court's express finding that the action of rezoning the eight acre
property was legislative in nature." Justice Burger properly distinguished
those cases relied upon by the Ohio Supreme Court that invalidated the
requirement of neighborhood approval' 2 from a referendum of the entire
electorate of the municipality.
3
Once the premise that rezoning is legislative was accepted, there
could be no argument against an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
A referendum on a truly legislative matter is clearly not a delegation of
power by the legislative body of a municipality, but a statutorily au-
thorized retention of such power by the electorate. The Ohio Supreme
Court's majority opinion sowed the seeds of its own reversal by finding
that the rezoning of one parcel was legislative in nature.
B. The Stevens Dissent
Justice Stevens directly addresses the question of the nature of the
rezoning process. His analysis examines both due process for the indi-
vidual property owner and the social issue of exclusionary zoning. It
grounds in sound constitutional principles the means of satisfying con-
flicting demands in the choice of land use and pits land development
interests and civil rights and housing advocates against a conservative
establishment and a suburban status quo mentality.
9. Id.
10. 426 U.S. at 677 n. ll.
11. To be subject to Ohio's referendum procedure, the question must be one
within the scope of legislative power. The Ohio Supreme Court expressly found
that the City Council's action in rezoning respondent's eight acres from light
industrial to high-density residential use was legislative in nature.
Id. at 673.
12. Forest City Enterprises v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 191-95, 70 Ohio
Op. 2d 384, 386-88, 324 N.E.2d 740, 744-46 (1975); Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co.
v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917);
Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
13. 426 U.S. at 675-80.
Justice Stevens recognizes the fundamental need for flexibility in a
zoning plan created by the changing character of neighborhoods, social
and political changes, ecological necessity, location and availability of
roads and utilities, economic facts of construction cost and financing,
governmental needs, and market and consumer choice. 4 He believes the
opportunity to apply for a zoning change is an aspect of property own-
ership protected by the fourteenth amendment due process clause 15 and,
therefore, requires procedural safeguards in the dispensation of special
grants. 16 There is a basic distinction between the zoning ordinance for the
entire municipality, which involves municipality-wide policy issues and
is legislative, which involves municipality-wide policy issues and is
legislative, and the use change of a specific property, which is an exercise
of judicial authority. 17 Without due process constraints, the power to
deny arbitrarily may give rise to the power to exact intolerable conditions,
including criminal extortion.' 8 Such'power also can, as in the Eastlake
case, perpetuate exclusionary and discriminatory land use policies.
Justice Stevens recognizes the fundamental confusion caused by
labeling zoning actions legislative, judicial, or administrative. The Ohio
Supreme Court gave the zoning change process a "legislative" label.19
Justice Stevens notes that if the "administrative" label were applied to
the zoning change process involved, which is the practice of many state
boards, it would have barred referendum approval.2 This implies that
such an "administrative" action also requires procedural due process
safeguards. Justice Stevens would affirm the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision that the Eastlake charter provision requiring mandatory referen-
dum approval of zoning changes violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment because zoning changes are judicial and not legis-
lative.
14. Id. at 681-82 n.3; Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 168, 215
N.W.2d 179, 191-92 (1974); Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of
City Planning and Zoning, 24 ILL. L. REV. 135, 145 (1929).
15. 426 U.S. at 682-83.
16. Id. at 683-85.
17. Id. at 682-86. Stevens finds support for his position in state supreme court
opinions of Oregon, Washington, and Colorado. Fasano v. Board of Comm'rs, 264 Or. 575,
580-81, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 292, 295, 502 P.2d 327,
329-31 (1972); Snyder v. City of Lakewood, - Colo. -, 542 P.2d 371, 373-74 (1975). See
also West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 468-72, 221 N.W.2d 303, 308-10(1974); Kelly v.
John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N.W.2d 713, 714 (1956); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Markets,
Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 537-38, 516 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1973); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42
N.J. Super. 495, 501, 127 A.2d 190, 193 (1956); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 2, 394 P.2d
808, 808 (1964); Freilich, Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County:
Is Rezoning an Administrative or Legislative Function?, 6 URBAN LAWYER Vii (1974).
18. 426 U.S. at 685; United States v. Staszank, 517 F.2d 53, 56 (7th Cir. 1975).
19. See note I I and accompanying text supra. See also note 13 supra.
20. 426 U.S. at 691-92 n.14.
III. Recognition of Judicial Nature of Rezoning Requiring Due
Process When a Challenge is Made
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the judicial nature
and due process requirements of the rezoning process when there is a
challenge of unnecessary hardship that would render a property value-
less.2 The majority opinion indicates that administrative relief is avail-
able if there is proof that zoning renders a property valueless, diminishes
its value below that when acquired, or is subject to practical difficulties
and unnecessary hardship.22 Under state law such administrative relief
requires a due process hearing, the taking of evidence, and review by the
state courts. This "use variance" procedure accomplishes a zoning use
change in an adjudicatory proceeding.
23
The Supreme Court has also recognized the requirements of due
process in the rezoning process when a challenge of exclusionary zoning
has been made. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp. ,24 the Court indicated zoning change, based on a
challenge that the zoning was racially discriminatory, requires proof of
racially discriminatory intent or purpose. 25 Proof of intent or purpose can
be established only in a judicial context in which there is "a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available."
26
If there had been some proof of exclusionary intent or purpose in the
Eastlake record, how could the Supreme Court continue to support its
finding that the rezoning process was legislative rather than judicial? The
concurring opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court took judicial notice of the
exclusionary intent and purpose of the mandatory referendum proce-
dure. 27 Zoning change in response to allegations of discriminatory pur-
21. Id. at 674-80 nn.8 & 13.
22. Id. See also Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (Cal. App. 1976);
Equitable Building Co. v. City of Royal Oak, 67 Mich. App. 223, 240 N.W.2d 489 (1976).
23. Wilkins v. City of San Bernadino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946); Baum v.
City of Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688 (1961); Bartlett v. Zoning Comm'n of Old Lyme,
161 Conn. 24, 282 A.2d 907 (1971); Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968); State v. Adjustment Bd. of Baton Rouge, 220 La. 708, 57 So. 2d 409 (1952);
City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965); MacGibbon v. Board of
Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Schere v. Township of
Freehold, 119 N.J. Super. 433, 292 A.2d 35 (1972); Voelcker v. Glen Cove, 28 Misc. 2d 265,
212 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1961); Helms v. Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961); State v.
Leighton, 113 Ohio App. 487, 173 N.E.2d 715 (1959); Shopping Centers of Greater Cincin-
nati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 313, 173 N.E.2d 196 (1958); Ferry v.
Kownacki, 396 Pa. 283, 152 A.2d 456 (1959); In re Garbev, 385 Pa. 328, 122 A.2d 682 (1956);
Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 385 Pa. 110, 122 A.2d 65 (1956); Township of
Haverford v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 207, 344 A.2d 758 (1975); Pfile v.
Zoning Board of Adjustment, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 226, 298 A.2d 598 (1972); El Paso v.
Donohue, 344 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Fairfax County v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44
S.E.2d 9 (1947); Carter v. Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949); McQUILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.45 (3d ed. 1949).
24. 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
25. Id. at 563.
26. Id. at 564.
27. 70 Ohio Op. 2d 384, 390-92, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 198-209, 324 N.E.2d 740, 748-49.
pose has, without exception, required evidentiary hearings, fulfillment of
due process requirements, and judicial review.
28
A. The Variance-Rezoning Dichotomy
The dichotomy created by the majority in Eastlake between the use
change by variance for hardship and ordinary rezoning 29 is actually an
artificial distinction. The Court has recognized that zoning use change by
proof of hardship or of exclusion requires a judicial-type process that
entails the presentation of evidence and court review pursuant to federal
or state standards. 30 The dichotomy persists for historical reasons. The
Standard State Zoning Enabling Acts of the 1920's created a division of
functions between the zoning board and governing body. 31 The basic flaw
28. The strict evidentiary standard required in Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), is consistent with prior exclusionary
challenges brought in the federal courts. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), aff'g 503
F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974); Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976); Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250
(9th Cir. 1974); Steel Hill Dev. Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 960-61 (Ist Cir.
1972); Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal.
1971); Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376, 332 N.Y.S.2d 138, 150,
285 N.E.2d 291, 300, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
The evidentiary standard in the state courts derives from state zoning enabling acts that
require zoning to bear a substantial relationship to the police power purposes of promoting
health, safety, and welfare. This standard in turn derives from the Supreme Court decision
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See notes I and 3 supra.
State court decisions have held minimum lot sizes in areas of growth trends and population
pressures exclusionary. Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Warren, 160 Conn. 397,
279 A.2d 567 (1971); Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359
A.2d 526 (1976); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1976); Oakwood at Madison, Inc.
v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. II, 283 A.2d 353 (1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar
Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land-Investment Co. v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965); Board of County Sup'rs of Fairfax County v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
Pennsylvania, in a series of cases beginning with Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d
395 (1970) (failure to provide apartments as permitted uses), extended the exclusionary
concepts to zoning prohibitions and multi-family housing including townhouses. Casey v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974); Perlstein v. Borough of Monroeville,
25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 489, 361 A.2d 510 (1976); Dublin Properties v. Board of Comm'rs, 21 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 54, 342 A.2d 821 (1975); Appeal of FPA Corp., 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 221, 360
A.2d 851 (1976). Token areas of multi-family use were similarly condemned by the Pennsyl-
vania courts. Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466
(1975) (80 acres of 11,589 acres zoned for multiple family use held tokenism); Waynes-
borough Corp. v. Easttown Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 350 A.2d 895
(1976) (49 acres of 5,250 acres zoned for multiple family use held tokenism).
Prohibition of mobile home parks has been invalidated on similar exclusionary grounds.
Nickola v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975); Bristow v. City
of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971); McKee v. Township of
Montgomery, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 487, 364 A.2d 775 (1976). See Note, Removing the Bar to
Exclusionary Zoning to a Decent Home, 32 OHIo ST. L.J. 373 (1971).
29. See note 5 supra.
30. See notes 21-26 supra.
31. In the 1920's the Department of Commerce under the direction of Secretary
Herbert Hoover prepared two models that established the broad outlines of statutory land
planning in the United States. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act provided a model for
states to follow in authorizing the division of territory into districts with uniform regulations
throughout the district, but with different regulations for each district. The Standard City
Planning Enabling Act, prepared in 1928 after 29 states had adopted the state model, was a
in the Standard Acts of the 1920's is the assumption that once a zoning
ordinance was adopted it would be good for all time.32 The only proce-
dure available to a landowner who sought a zoning change was to petition
the governing body for a legislative change in the zoning ordinance. The
only relief mechanism subject to court review under the Standard Act
ordinances was an application to the zoning board, a local lay body
empowered to grant variances.
The variance was intended to relax the strict application of zoning
regulations and thereby allow permitted uses to conform to unique phys-
ical circumstances or conditions of a particular property, such as an
irregular lot or unusual topography. Typical variances related to yard
requirements, setbacks, height requirements, lot area, floor area, and
required parking. The variance procedure was expanded to fulfill a need
to conform land use to changes in the character of neighborhoods and
unforeseeable social, political, ecological, economic, and market condi-
tions.33 The expanded variance procedure provided a means to rezone by
challenging the zoning ordinance as applied to the particular property.
The decision of the zoning board was appealable to a court of competent
jurisdiction. The evolution of the variance procedure from one affording
minor relief to one capable of granting a large scale zoning use change
illustrates the gradual recognition by courts of the judicial nature of the
rezoning process, a recognition long hindered by the dichotomy of func-
tion between the zoning board and the governing body dictated by the
Standard Act ordinances.
The prime example of this evolution is the Pennsylvania experience.
Pennsylvania is a Standard Act zoning state and mature in terms of
development and zoning case law. The Pennsylvania zoning enabling
legislation was recodified in the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning
Code. 34 The statute maintained the mutually exclusive "legislative rezon-
ing" by the governing body 35 and "administrative relief of hardship by
variance" by the zoning board.36
model for cities to use in establishing a planning agency and a master plan. The acts may be
found at ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 210, 222 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968). Most
states have developed a compartmentalized approach to zoning with a cumbersome distribu-
tion of powers and functions among the governing body, zoning board, planning commis-
sion, and sundry other officers and agencies because they utilized these acts as models.
32. See Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Krasnowiecki]; Rosenzweig, The Curative
Amendment Procedure in Pennsylvania: The Landowner's Challenge to the Substantive
Validity of Zoning Restrictions, 80 DICK. L. REV. 43, 44 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Rosenzweig].
33. Justice Stevens in Eastlake recognizes the fundamental need for change in a
zoning plan and states, "As land continues to become more scarce, and as land use planning
constantly becomes more sophisticated, the needs and the opportunities for unforeseen uses
of specific parcels of real estate continually increase." See 426 U.S. at 681.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972).
35. Id. § 10609.
36. Id. § 10912.
In 1972 the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code was amend-
ed by creating a "middle ground" between legislative rezoning by the
governing body and administrative relief of hardship by the zoning board.
The procedure provided for a "substantive challenge" to the validity of
the zoning ordinance as applied to a particular property. 37 The landowner
can choose either the zoning board 38 or the governing body, 39 but in
either forum the application for a use change must be a "substantive
challenge" to the validity of the zoning ordinance. 4° The governing body
can grant the request by curative amendment. 41 The zoning board can
make findings and conclusions for review by a court.42 The refusal of the
governing body to adopt the curative amendment is also subject to court
review.43
The "middle ground" contained in the 1972 amendments to the
Pennsylvania zoning enabling statute provided a procedure for a landow-
ner to propose a use in lieu of that permitted, required development plans,
and provided structured due process hearings and court review.' The
need for this "middle ground" is evidenced by the great difficulty
experienced by the Pennsylvania courts in adapting variance criteria to
use change requests. The variance procedure for such use change requests
proved unsatisfactory. 45 The case law from the long entrenched Standard
37. Id. § 11004(1).
38. Id. §§ 11004(1)(a), 10910.
39. Id. §§ 11004(1)(b), 10609.1.
40. Id. § 11004(l).
41. Id. §§ 10609.1, 11004.
42. Id. § 10910.
43. Id. §§ 11004, 11008-11011. A court may grant the use, but not the zoning amend-
ment, on appeal from the refusal of the governing body to grant a curative amendment.
Ellick v. Board of Sup'rs of Worcester Tp., 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 415, 333 A.2d 239, 246
(1975).
44. Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-
11202 (Purdon 1972). The major amendments are contained in §§ 10609.1 and 11001-11011.
45. The Pennsylvania courts have ignored some of the variance criteria, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10912 (Purdon 1972), in granting a use change request. E.g., property not
unique: Perice v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 410 Pa. 262, 189 A.2d 138 (1963) (gas station
permitted in residential district even though other residential property was subject to the
same hardship); Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958)
(business vehicle parking permitted in residential district); Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 385 Pa. 110, 122 A.2d 65 (1956)(drive-in theater permitted in residential dis-
trict); self-inflicted hardship by purchasing with knowledge of zoning: Gro Appeal, 440 Pa.
552, 560, 269 A.2d 876, 880-81 (1970); Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 385 Pa. 110,
122 A.2d 65 (1956); Borough of Ingram v. Sinicrope, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 448, 303 A.2d 855
(1973); McKay v. North Huntington Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 29, 300 A.2d
810 (1973); Pfile v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 7 Pa. Commw. Ct. 226, 298 A.2d 598 (1972).
See also Schaaf v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 50, 347 A.2d 740 (1975); Surrick
v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 607, 314 A.2d 565 (1974). The Pennsylvania
courts have applied variance criteria to deny meritorious use change requests. E.g., landow-
ner proved a deprivation of all reasonable use by the zoning: Gro Appeal, 440 Pa. 552, 269
A.2d 876 (1970); Sposato v. Board of Adjustment, 440 Pa.,107, 270 A.2d 616 (1970); McClure
Appeal, 415 Pa. 285, 203 A.2d 534 (1964); Cooper v. Board of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 429, 195
A.2d 101 (1963); landowner proved appropriateness of proposed use to neighborhood:
O'Neill v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 434 Pa. 331, 254 A.2d 12 (1969); Commissioners of
Plymouth Tp. v. Wannop, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 237, 320 A.2d 455 (1974); Philadelphia Bd. of
Adjustment v. Earl Scheib Realty Corp., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 11, 301 A.2d 423 (1973); Arena
Act dichotomy of function between the governing body and the zoning
board imposed blinders on the Pennsylvania courts. The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court46 was caught in a label trap47 in its attempt to
construe the 1972 amendments to the Pennsylvania Municipalities Plan-
ning Code. The labels and semantic precedent prevented the court from
perceiving the nature of the use change process and the need for the
"middle ground" that the Pennsylvania Legislature had tried to create.
In a series of 1975 decisions, 8 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court, contrary to the statutory scheme of the 1972 amendments to the
MPC, maintained the dichotomy of function between the zoning board
and governing body. The Commonwealth Court resurrected the use
variance with all its pitfalls and inconsistencies. Rather, it should have
broadened the use change challenge beyond the strict variance criteria.
Such variance criteria were intended for the minor relaxation of zoning
regulations to accommodate permitted uses and not for use change re-
quests .
B. Challenge or Rezoning
The categorization of zoning change requests according to whether
they entail challenges is just an extension of the artificial distinction
between the use change by variance for hardship and the ordinary rezon-
ing. Both the exclusionary challenge and the challenge of deprivation of
all reasonable use have been brought in the procedural context of chal-
lenge. A formal case is made to support the challenge and there is court
review. 50 The legislative rezoning procedure does not entail a formal
challenge to the existing ordinance, but rather a solicitation for the
proposed use. Elements of challenge may be present, but are not formally
developed in the proceeding.
The Eastlake case illustrates the constraints of the legislative rezon-
ing procedure when challenge is not the prime objective. Because the
zoning change request was pursued as part of a legislative rezoning, the
issues of whether Eastlake's zoning of the subject property for industrial
v. Norristown Borough Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 285, 276 A.2d 838
(1971). The Pennsylvania courts have also applied variance criteria as a makeweight in
denying a use change when the landowner failed to make a meritorious case either by
proving a deprivation of all reasonable use or the appropriateness of the proposed use to the
neighborhood. E.g., self-inflicted hardship by purchasing with knowledge of zoning: Appeal
of Bilotta, 440 Pa. 105, 270 A.2d 619 (1970); Patti Appeal, 440 Pa. 101, 270 A.2d 400 (1970);
MacLean v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 82, 185 A.2d 533 (1962); Marple Gardens,
Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 436, 303 A.2d 239 (1973); Drop v.
North Huntington Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 6 Pa. Commw. Ct. 64, 293 A.2d 144 (1972).
46. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court is an appellate court with jurisdiction
over zoning appeals.
47. Justice Stevens' dissent in Eastlake perceives the pitfalls of labelling and the need
to look to the substance of the matter. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
48. Ellick v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975); Robin
Corp. v. Board of Sup'rs, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 386, 332 A.2d 841 (1975); Board of Comm'rs
v. Beho Dev. Corp., 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 448, 332 A.2d 848 (1975).
49. Rosenzweig, supra note 32, at 50-53.
50. See notes 23 and 28 and accompanying text supra.
use was reasonable and whether the city unlawfully attempted to exclude
low and moderate income housing were raised in argument rather than by
direct evidence. 5 Although the elements of challenge and requisite proof
were present, they were not developed because the legislative rezoning
procedure does not dictate a challenge to the existing ordinance. The
procedure is limited to persuasion as to the efficacy of the proposed use.
In reviewing the record in the Eastlake case, the appellate courts pointed
out the lack of proof that the zoning was unreasonable or that the zoning
scheme was exclusionary and declined to decide these issues.
52
The failure of legislative rezoning to provide a procedure to develop
such a challenge gives the court a basis for holding that there is no
challenge intended and, therefore, no reason for due process hearings and
court review. Just as the dichotomy between use change by variance and
use change by legislative rezoning must be erased, so must the larger and
parallel distinction between zoning change requests that entail challenges
and those that do not.
Justice Stevens in the dissent in Eastlake perceives that all zoning
change requests entail a challenge and are, therefore, subject to an
adjudicatory process. 53 The gap between the zoning change by challenge
and the zoning change by request for rezoning is dictated by the
dichotomy of procedure 54 and a failure to perceive the interrelationship of
the two bases for zoning use change. The arguments made by Justice
Stevens in Eastlake and the authorities cited55 also fail to fully reconcile
the distinction between the processes of challenge and application for
rezoning to the legislative body.
The views expressed by the majority in Eastlake and Justice Stevens
apparently are irreconcilable. The majority sees zoning change as strictly
legislative with the exception of the administrative variance relief for
undue hardship. 56 Justice Stevens, on the contrary, views all zoning
change as an adjudicatory process that requires due process of law. 
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There is a common ground between these two viewpoints and reason to
forge one category of use change request and procedure from the two
divergent categories defined by the majority and dissenting opinions in
the Eastlake case.
IV. The Unity of Use Change Requests
The principles established in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co. 58 that zoning provisions are unconstitutional when they are clearly
51. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
52. See note 51 supra.
53. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 35-49 and accompanying text supra.
55. See notes 14-20 and accompanying text supra.
56. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
57. See notes 6, 14-20 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 1 and 3 supra.
arbitrary, unreasonable, and have no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare must be extended and defined
precisely. The safeguards should be applied to the zoning ordinance as it
relates to the property under changed conditions in addition to the initial
comprehensive municipality-wide zoning ordinance. The definition of
"having a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare" now encompasses professionally prepared comprehen-
sive plans, community development objectives, new methods of planning
and development, and the effects of development needs and trends. All
standards for use change requests for a particular property derive from the
Euclid principle that zoning regulations must bear a substantial relation to
police power purposes of promoting and protecting the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare.
The failure of a zoning use restriction to serve a proper public
purpose is demonstrated by the following indicia: (1) the effect on a
particular property of partial or total deprivation of value without serving
a legitimate public purpose, 59 (2) total or near total exclusion of a
legitimate use, particularly housing uses with a resulting exclusion of
economic groups, 60 and (3) prohibition of an appropriate use for the
property. 61 The landowner in the Eastlake case may have been able to
prove one or more of the foregoing elements. Such proof would constitute
a challenge to the zoning ordinance as applied to the specific property.
Once a use change request is recognized as a challenge based upon one or
more of the above elements, an adequate procedure for reviewing such
requests can be easily developed.62 Justice Stevens' belief in the judicial
nature of the rezoning process would then be satisfied in the context of the
Eastlake factual situation.
The three elements that demonstrate the failure of a zoning use to
serve a proper public purpose63 are interrelated and may complement each
other in a particular situation. In National Land & Investment Company
v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 64 the plaintiff was able to
prove that homes on one acre lots were appropriate for land zoned for a
four acre minimum because of local and regional development needs and
trends. The appropriate use consideration in National Land was aug-
mented by proof of exclusion of lower economic groups, the failure of the
zoning ordinance to serve a proper public purpose, and confiscation
because four acre lots were unmarketable.
59. See note 23 supra.
60. See note 28 supra.
61. Hauser v. Borough of Catasauqua Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 313,
341 A.2d 566 (1975); Krasnowiecki, supra note 32, at 1102; Rosenzweig, supra note 32, at
65, 67.
62. The Pennsylvania curative amendment procedure, with some modifications, is an
example of such a procedure. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text supra.
63. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
64. 419 Pa. 504, 152 A.2d 597 (1965).
The deprivation of all reasonable use by a zoning ordinance is
integrally related to the exclusionary and appropriate use grounds. The
confiscation ground is asserted within a broad planning context in which
the physical characteristics of the site, location of the site, market for uses
on the site as dictated by development needs and trends, and the exclusion
of the range of appropriate uses are considered. There is a unity of factual
and legal considerations in an application for zoning use change.
The elements of proof in a use change request illustrate this interrela-
tionship. Deprivation of all reasonable use and confiscation by zoning
depend on the economic feasibility of the permitted uses for the site.
Confiscation results when the permitted uses are not economically feas-
ible for a private owner. This may be established by expert testimony that
details the development costs of permitted uses and relates the costs and
reasonable profit margins to marketability. Marketability comprises the
needs of local and regional development including recent sales, types of
development, rate of growth, and socioeconomic makeup of the region.
A qualified real estate expert must form an opinion based on such data.
Zoning at a level where development will not occur65 often combines
both confiscation and exclusion. A large minimum lot size or a total
prohibition of multiple family use at the time of a growing need for
housing confiscates by pricing the land out of the market and also
excludes economic groups that require lower priced housing. 66 In the case
of exclusion of multiple family uses the landowner may present evidence
of local and regional development needs, trends, and market conditions.
The relationship of the socioeconomic composition of the municipality to
permitted housing types may reveal an exclusion of certain economic
groups. 67
With an apportunity for judicial review guided by the above stand-
ards, Forest City Enterprises may have been able to establish confiscation
and exclusion by the Eastlake zoning, which would warrant the requested
use change. Failing this, Forest City Enterprises may well have asserted
the third ground for a use change request68 -the prohibition of an
appropriate use of the property. This basis for asserting a use change has
emerged with the increasingly sophisticated science and practice of devel-
opment planning for the site, locality, and region. 69 This third ground is
65. Krasnowiecki, supra note 32, at 1034; Rosenzweig, supra note 32, at 58.
66. Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land &
Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
See generally cases listed in note 28 supra, particularly Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown
Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 137, 350 A.2d 895 (1976).
67. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,336
A.2d 713 (1975); Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 448-49, 341
A.2d 466, 468 (1975).
68. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
69. Town of Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 188, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129,
136 (1973); Udall v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 471, 476, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-95, 899
(1968); Grant v. Washington Tp., I Ohio App. 2d 84, 87, 203 N.E.2d 859, 861-62 (1963);
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 295, 502 P.2d 327, 329 (1972).
an extension of the Euclid principle. 70 Zoning may eliminate inapprop-
riate uses from a zoning district or even an entire municipality only if the
decision is based upon rational planning principles. If zoning eliminates
uses without a valid planning reason, it is arbitrary and serves no public
purpose.
A landowner may prove this failure to serve a public purpose by
showing that his proposed use is appropriate for the site. Appropriate use
is a broad planning question that requires an analysis of the following
considerations: the physical characteristics of the site, other nearby uses,
such as roads, schools, or commercial, recreational, shopping, and com-
munity facilities, local and regional development needs and trends, new
planning concepts, and the comprehensive plan or community devel-
opment objectives of the municipality. If the landowner can prove that his
proposed use for the particular site is appropriate within this broad
context, he has established that the applicable zoning restrictions do not
bear a substantial relation to police power purposes of preserving public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 
71
The proof of the appropriateness of a proposed use for a larger site
entails an investigation of its physical characteristics including topog-
raphy, surface and subsurface soil, rock and drainage conditions, preser-
vation of natural vegation, cost of suitable drainage, soil erosion and
sedimentation controls, and a comparison of economic and environmental
costs of developing permitted uses with costs incident to the proposed
use. A combined effort of site and soil engineers and architect-site
planners can result in a recommended development plan most appropriate
to the physical characteristics of the site.
Appropriateness of the proposed use can also be established in the
context of land use planning. A professional planner can analyze the
proposed and permitted uses in terms of the development objectives
established by the municipality's comprehensive plan and the relationship
of other nearby uses and local and regional development trends. New
concepts in planned development such as planned unit development and
planned residential development might dictate the most appropriate use of
a particular site.
72
Forest City Enterprises apparently established to the satisfaction of
the Eastlake council that its multiple family use was appropriate for the
site within the foregoing guidelines and that the zoning limitation of the
property to industrial use served no public purpose. Court review, not
public referendum, protects the due process rights of both property owner
and the minority in the referendum.
70. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
71. See Rosenzweig, supra note 32, at 65.
72. Id. at 67-68.
V. One Procedure
The law as expressed by the majority in Eastlake does not require
adjudicatory due process in zoning change requests unless a hardship
challenge is made. Due process, however, is required for an exclusionary
challenge zoning change request. 73 There are compelling reasons why the
law should recognize a single use change procedure with defined stand-
ards, due process, and court review. The Eastlake opinions by the
Supreme Court, majority and dissenting, and the Ohio Supreme Court
recognize that some measure of due process is required in all zoning
change requests. 
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Due process is a judicial and not a legislative concept. The Eastlake
majority tries to imbue what it terms a legislative referendum process
with elements of judicial due process by pointing out the possibilities for
such judicial due process in other contexts that entail hardship, a chal-
lenge to the entire zoning ordinance, or court review of the legislative
referendum process itself. A comparison of the final footnotes of the
majority opinion and Stevens' dissent in Eastlake 75 reveals that the
majority seeks to satisfy the due process requirement by pointing to the
constitutionally sufficient procedure available for hardship cases or chal-
lenges to the entire ordinance. The majority further seeks to rationalize
the lack of due process by suggesting that the referendum result can be
challenged in a state court under both state law and fourteenth amendment
standards. 76 Such an after-the-fact court review is not due process, but
merely an opportunity to review the lack of due process afforded in a
prior decision-making process.
Justice Stevens mentions several reasons for affording adjudicatory
due process to zoning change requests. The need for specific zoning
change is an established fact. "As land continues to become more scarce,
and as land use planning constantly becomes more sophisticated, the need
and the opportunities for unforeseen uses of specific parcels of real estate
-continually increase.' 77 Responsible zoning plans accommodate the need
for presently unforeseeable change and regularly provide a procedure for
granting individual changes. These aspects of planning support Justice
Stevens' opinion that the opportunity to apply for a zoning change is an
aspect of property ownership protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.78
Justice Stevens stresses the distinction between the adoption of a
comprehensive city-wide plan by legislative action and later decisions
that deviate from this plan for specific uses of parcels. He discusses the
73. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
74. 426 U.S. at 681 n.2, 677 n.ll.
75. Id. at 679 n.13, 694 n.16.
76. Id. at 677 n. ll.
77. Id. at 681. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
78. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
comprehensive plan in connection with the necessity of articulable stand-
ards in the grant of a use change. 79 Recent state court opinions have
recognized the need for the input of judicial authority when there is
deviation from a comprehensive plan. Without such input there is a
potential for abuse arising from inadequate procedural safeguards in the
dispensation of special grants.
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The amicus brief by Richard F. Babcock, a noted zoning expert, sets
forth many of the policy reasons and authorities contained in the Stevens
dissent. 8' The importance of a comprehensive plan and its relation to
zoning use change is central to Mr. Babcock's brief. Mr. Babcock
emphasizes the need to secure the rights of the affected and neighboring
property owners when use change requests are considered.
Differential treatment is of the essence in American land use
controls. Since by definition a formal and mechanical equality
is out of the question, the only way to provide the essence of
equal treatment for these basic social interests is by an overall




If opportunity for change is the distinctive feature of zoning,
then the process by which a petition for change from the gener-
al law is deliberated, and the standards by which change is
granted or denied become central to fairness, to what we now
regard as due process of law. This essential fairness is impera-
tive to keep secure the rights in property, whether these be the
rights of the property owner who petitions for a change, or
those of the neighboring property owners who believe a change
will damage their land values as they perceive them ...
The literature of zoning carries the constant refrain that the
process involved in the grant or denial by change by whatever
local body-city council, plan commission or board of zoning
appeals-has been devoid of elementary standards of fairness
and forethought.8 3
This fair process, according to Mr. Babcock, is grounded in the
overall planning analysis that begins with the comprehensive plan. 84 Mr.
Babcock finds the key to his point of view in the opinion of Udall v.
Haas.
79. 426 U.S. at 691 n.12: "Rather the comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning.
Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the assurance that the public
welfare is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup
poll." Udall v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-94, 235 N.E.2d 897,900-01
(1968).
80. 426 U.S. at 683-86. See notes 17, 18 and accompanying text supra.
81. Brief for Amici Curiae, National Association of Home Builders, American Soci-
ety of Planning Officials, and American Institute of Planners, Richard F. Babcock, David L.
Callies, and R. Marlin Smith, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Amici brief].
82. Amici brief, supra note 81, at 14-15 (quoting N. WILLIAMs, AMERICAN LAND
PLANNING LAW 4, 5 (1975)) (emphasis added).
83. Amici brief, supra note 81, at 15.
84. Id. at 23-32.
Rather the comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. With-
out it, there can be no rational allocation of land use. It is the
assurance that the public welfare is being served and that zon-
ing does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll. a5
The single, unified procedure for use change requests requires the
decision-maker to apply standards derived from a comprehensive plan
and undertake an overall planning analysis of all the major considerations
that bear on the request. This can best be achieved in a judicial proceed-
ing. The applicant for change has the burden of establishing that the
proposed use will promote the public health, safety, and general welfare
within the context of the comprehensive plan and the major planning
considerations that bear on the request. Neighboring owners may in-
troduce contrary evidence.
The single, unified procedure for use change requests must provide
for an evaluation of the interrelated legal and planning bases for such
requests 86 and set forth the required submission of development plans,
elements of proof, and standards that will apply.
The following is suggested:
I. Zoning Use Change Request
A. Any land owner, his representative, or option holder may
apply to the zoning hearing board for use change of his property
from the applicable zoning use restrictions.
B. Such application shall include 7
1. Development plans for the use proposed in lieu of a
permitted use, sufficient to provide reasonable notice of the
proposed use and a sufficient basis for evaluating it in light of
the standards contained herein,
2. A statement of how such proposed use will promote
the adopted comprehensive plan or community development
objectives,
3. A statement, if applicable, of how permitted uses are
not economically feasible, or how the applicable zoning results
in a substantial deprivation of value of the land,
4. A statement, if applicable, of whether the proposed
use will remedy the total or substantial exclusion of a legitimate
use,
5. A statement, if applicable, of whether the proposed
use would remedy a pattern, whether intentional or not, of
exclusion of economically deprived portions of the population
of the region,
85. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-94 (1968); Amici brief, supra note 81,
at 24-25. Other cases cited and discussed by Mr. Babcock include Forestview Homeowners
Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 III. App. 3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763; City of Louisville v.
Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973); Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174
N.W.2d 789 (1970); Town of Bedford v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 33 N.Y.3d 178, 351 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1973); Grant v. Washington Tp., I Ohio App. 2d 84, 87, 203 N.E.2d 859, 861-62 (1963);
Garber v. Joseph Skilken & Co., 33 Ohio Misc. 178, 293 N.E.2d 333 (1972); Fasano v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Board of Sup'rs of Fairfax County v.
Snell Construction Corp., 214 Va. 655,202 S.E.2d 889 (1974); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81
Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972).
86. See notes 58-72 and accompanying text supra.
87. Id.
6. A statement of the appropriateness of the proposed
use in terms of the following criteria, but not limited thereto:
a. Physical characteristics of the site including topog-
raphy, surface and subsurface conditions, intended preserva-
tion of natural vegetation, comparative costs of drainage, soil
erosion, and sedimentation controls for permitted uses and
proposed use, comparison of economic and environmental
costs of developing permitted uses with costs incident to the
proposed use;
b. Relation to other nearby uses including roads,
schools, commercial, recreational, shopping, and community
facilities;
c. Local and regional development needs and trends;
d. How the proposed use would implement new plan-
ning concepts of planned development including planned unit
development and planned residential development;
e. Specific fulfillment of comprehensive plan and
community development objectives;
C. The zoning hearing board members shall be appointed for a
four year term by the governing body, and shall be composed of
a lawyer, a civil engineer, an architect or planner, a social
worker, and a business person. The zoning hearing board shall
hear evidence, make a stenographic record, and grant or deny
the use change request. Public notice of all hearings shall be
given, and such hearings shall be open to the public. Delibera-
tions of the zoning hearing board shall be in private session.
The lawyer member shall serve as chairman and make rulings
on evidentiary matters. Members of the board shall be compen-
sated on a per diem basis. The municipality shall appropriate
funds for the operation of the zoning hearing board. Each
municipality shall receive a grant from the county to help de-
fray the cost of the zoning hearing board. The amount of the
grant shall be based upon the assessed value of the real estate in
the municipality, and in inverse proportion thereto relative to
other municipalities in the county. An application fee not to
exceed $500 may be charged an applicant to be used to partially
defray the cost of the proceeding before the zoning hearing
board .88
D. Residents of the municipality may intervene in the pro-
ceeding before the zoning hearing board and shall pay all inter-
vention fee not to exceed $300 to be used to partially defray the
cost of the proceeding before the zoning hearing board. No
resident who has not intervened shall have standing to present
evidence which shall become part of the record, nor to file an
appeal to court from the decision of the board. Failure to
88. A semiprofessional paid board without municipal legal counsel is a departure from
zoning boards set up under Standard State Zoning Enabling Act legislation. It will avoid the
problem of conflict of interest when the municipal solicitor also represents the municipal
zoning board. Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 337 A.2d 858 (1975); Limekiln
Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, I Pa. Commw. Ct. 499, 275 A.2d 896 (1971).
The legal counsel often has undue weight as a nonvoting participant in the decision-making
process. A paid semiprofessional board is justified because it will bring greater expertise to
a complicated area and will devote the time and care necessary to a just solution. This
rationale has been applied with succees in American Arbitration Association panels and in
medical malpractice arbitration boards. See Pennsylvania Health Care Services Malpractice
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.101-1006 (Purdon 1977).
intervene shall not preclude a resident from presenting his
personal views at the public hearing.89
E. The applicant shall have the right to appeal a denial of the
use change request to the Common Pleas Court. The record
made before the zoning hearing board shall be reviewed by the
court, and may be supplemented by leave of court. The court
shall make a view of the property and surrounding area, and
may make its own findings of fact whether or not it receives
additional testimony. The court may grant the use change re-
quest subject to compliance with other reasonable regulations
of the municipality generally applicable to the type of use
granted, and shall retain jurisdiction to enforce its order.
90
F. Residents objecting to the grant of a use change request
who have intervened may appeal the grant to the Common
Pleas Court. The court shall upon the filing of the appeal
promptly review the record and decision of the zoning hearing
board, and shall set a bond to be posted by the objector. The
bond shall indemnify the applicant from delay caused by the
appeal. The court shall consider the merits of the appeal before
setting bond. Failure to post bond by the objector shall result in
the dismissal of the appeal. 9'
89. The question of standing has recently been discussed in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), and Southern Burlington
Co. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed,
423 U.S. 808 (1976). These cases found at least one individual plaintiff who had demon-
strated standing to assert the rights as his own and declined to consider whether other
individual, corporate, or association plaintiffs had standing. The crucial rights involved are
those of the property owner and other residents of the municipality. Even the municipal
government should not have standing to intervene because it would be asserting claims of
individual property owners. See Snelling v. Department of Transporation, 27 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 276, 366 A.2d 1298 (1976).
90. The requirement that the court grant leave to supplement the record before the
zoning hearing board would prevent complete duplication of the proceeding before the
zoning hearing board. Such duplication is often necessitated by a rule that the court cannot
make its own findings of fact unless it hears the case de novo. The court under such a rule is
constrained to a determination whether the zoning hearing board has abused its discretion or
has committed an error of law. The proposed procedure would require the court to make a
view of the property, and give it the power to make its own findings of fact without the
necessity of holding a new hearing. See Borough of Glenfield v. C. & E. Motors, Inc., 22 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 115, 347 A.2d 732 (1975).
The court should be able to grant definitive relief and retain jurisdiction to enforce its
order. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 11011 (Purdon 1972).
91. The bond provision is designed to prevent an objector from frustrating an ap-
proved use change request with a delaying appeal. It is more equitable than the provision
contained in the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10916
(Purdon 1972) as construed by the Pennsylvania courts in the following cases: Mont-Bux,
Inc. v. McKinstry, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 194, 365 A.2d 1329 (1976); Neshaminy Plaza II v.
Kelly, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 469, 346 A.2d 884 (1975); Hercek v. Whitehall Tp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 509, 342 A.2d 127 (1975); Orleans v. Millrose Park
Improvement Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 185, 335 A.2d 851 (1975); Driscoll v. Plymouth Tp.,
13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 320 A.2d 444 (1974). The suggested bond piovision follows a
recommendation of Judge Rogers in the dissent in Driscoll v. Plymouth Tp., 13 Pa. Commw.
Ct. at 412-13, 320 A.2d at 449.
The judicial construction of the Pennsylvania bond requirement for objectors is pres-
ently under attack in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylva-
nia. Pine Tp. Citizen's Ass'n v. Arnold, No. 76-813 (W.D. Pa.). The challenge asserts that
the bond requirement, regardless of the merits of the appeal or the financial ability of the
appellants to post the bond, denies objectors their right to due process and equal protection
under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
G. The use change request procedure shall be separate and
distinct from requests for variances. Variance requests shall be
restricted to applications for the relaxation of zoning restric-
tions on a permitted use in the zoning district in the case of
hardship. Such requests shall be handled by the zoning hearing
board under separate sections pursuant to the procedure and
criteria therein set forth. Variance criteria as set forth in prior
statutes and case law shall not be applicable to use change
requests under this section. 92
VI. Conclusion
The Euclid decision and the Standard Acts of fifty years ago have
shaped American land use control and continue to have an overriding
influence. Premises of fifty years ago no longer hold true. A zoning plan
cannot determine the development of a community for all time. Ac-
celerating change and unforeseen development is a fact of contemporary
American life. Land use planning has become a multificated discipline.
Architects plan large sites, not just buildings. Sociological needs of
people are considered. Zoning must be sensitive to this change. The
sensitivity cannot be limited to political accountability, or subjected to
corrupt influence. The fundamental need for change in zoning regulations
requires a procedure that protects a property owner's rights of use and the
right to value as affected by the use of surrounding property.
The relationship between the contemporary reality of land use con-
trol and the rhetoric of zoning terminology is strained after fifty years.
The initial linguistic depiction93 of land use control contained in the
Euclid case and the Standard Acts must be reinterpreted in terms of the
advances in land development disciplines. Legislators and judges must
see new connotations in the old combinations of words that have become
the guiding principles of zoning law. Labels such as "legislative,"
"administrative," and "variance" should not distort the basic problem,
which is equitable and beneficial land use control in a society grounded in
property rights that is experiencing accelerated development and social
change. The change manifests itself in lifestyle, social concerns, methods
of planned development, and a new technology that eliminates old prob-
lems and creates new ones.
The procedure for zoning use change requests suggested above is
based on the preceding premises. Property owners are entitled to due
process in matters affecting the use of their property. Due process must
afford the opportunity to establish the right to the proposed use within a
procedure and according to standards that will insure that zoning does not
unduly deprive the owner of value, will serve to promote the public
92. See notes 29-49 and accompanying text, particularly notes 48 and 49 supra.
93. See Vatz, The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation, 6 PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC 154-
61 (1973). "No theory of the relationship between situations and rhetoric can neglect to take
account of the initial linguistic depiction of the situation." Id. at 157. See also M. EDELMAN,
POLITICS AS SYMBOLIC ACTION (1971); SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 52 (1974).
welfare, and is sensitive to the multitude of factors that dictate the
appropriateness of a use on the subject property.
A non-political, semi-professional, compensated zoning hearing
board that will hear and decide zoning change requests and the right to
court review are necessary to counteract the inequities in the present
system. Political pressures on elected officials make a zoning change
risky, even when it is manife stly warranted. Vesting the absolute right to
approve or deny in the municipal governing body gives rise to the
widespread practice of payoffs to achieve a zoning change that is not
necessarily appropriate for the public welfare. 
94
Finally, there is a need to raise perception in the area of land use
control from a level of fixed rules both in land use and land use change to
a level that recognizes the need to change both zoning regulations and the
matter (f effecting such change. This higher level must determine the
desirability of change after a rational consideration of the welfare of
society and individual rights. This higher level is consistent with the
concepts embodied in the constitutional guarantees of property rights and
due process of law. The present application and administration of zoning
law, which exists at the lower level of perception, seriously impedes the
application of constitutional principles of property rights and due process
in the field of zoning law.
95
94. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. The situation described in Staszcuk is
not atypical.
95. These levels of perception are derived from stages of moral reasoning identified
by Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard University in his research on cognitive moral
development. Dr. Kohlberg's fourth stage of moral reasoning stresses fixed rules; his fifth
stage recognizes the possibility of changing the rules after rational consideration of the
welfare of society and individual rights. According to Dr. Kohlberg, drafters of the United
States Constitution were operating and reasoning at this fifth stage. See L. KOHLBERG,
COLLECTED PAPERS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL EDUCATION (1973) (revised ver-
sion available in 1976 in two volumes from Moral Education Research Foundation, Harvard
University); Tapp & Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Justice, 27 JOURNAL OF
SOCIAL ISSUES 65 (1971). See also Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning Procedure:
The Complimentary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L. REV. 753
(1976).
